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Abstract
A wider RJV extension hastens process innovations at the cost of
increasing collusion in the ￿nal market. In a Cournot model, an extended
RJV is welfare enhancing only when the Antitrust Authority is strong,
so that the increase in distortion is limited, and when the size of the
technical improvement is large, so that the introduction of the innovation
is more valuable.
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11 Introduction
In 1984 the US Congress approved the National Cooperative Research Act
(NCRA), which grants antitrust immunity to ￿rms involved in RJVs focused
on the research stage only. The Act induced a relevant increase of RJV agree-
ments during the 90s, and also a pressure on the legislator to extend the RJV
breadth. Firms claimed that RJV members cannot make the most of the
results obtained in research if they cannot cooperate also in later stages. An
extended cooperation yields savings in the ￿xed costs involved by the up-
grade of the existing capital stock, by its enlargement, by the ￿ne-tuning of
the new product lines, etc. When the outcome of R&D is a new product, the
cost reduction entailed by an enhanced RJV concerns also design, marketing,
and others. In 1993 the Congress approved the National Cooperative Re-
search and Production Act (NCRPA), that extended the antitrust immunity
to RJVs dealing up to the production stage.1 Such a wider RJV breadth has
generated, mostly among practitioners but also within the profession, a wide-
spread concern of an increase in the product market degree of collusion, which
may reduce welfare. Recently, Goeree and Helland (2008), and Seldeslachts et
al. (2008) provide some indirect evidence that RJVs may facilitate collusion.
In this note, we assume that ￿in the pre-innovation market equilibrium ￿
noncooperative collusion is not viable, because the probability of detecting a
defection is too low. When ￿rms form a RJV under a NCRA-type legislation
(that we label type-I RJV), each ￿rm, at the time of discovery, must sustain a
￿xed cost that represents all the expenditures pertaining to the development
stage. Because type-I RJVs are focused only on research, we assume that the
probability of detecting a defection from collusion is not increased. On the
contrary, if ￿rms are allowed to cooperate up to the production stage ￿and
hence they are involved in a type-II RJV ￿the enhanced level of cooperation
leads to the development of information channels that increase the probability
1The NCRPA covers cooperative e⁄orts in R&D, production, application for patents,
granting licenses for the venture￿ s results, and the general management of the pro-
prietary interests of the venture. The following activities are instead excluded: ex-
change of information about prices, market shares and pro￿ts, agreements to re-
strict sales, or to ￿x prices, etc. For details, one can consult the NCRP Act at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/guidelin.htm.
2of detecting a defection. Such an increase is high enough that ￿rms may now
tacitly collude (as in many papers based on Friedman (1971)).
In our model, a type-II RJV hastens innovation not only because it implies
savings in ￿xed costs ￿which is socially valuable in itself ￿but also due to the
perspective of higher pro￿ts. This comes to the cost of an increased distortion
in the ￿nal product market. When a process innovation is introduced in a
Cournot market, an NCRPA-type legislation is welfare enhancing only when
the Antitrust Authority is strong, so that the increase in distortion is limited,
and when the size of the technical improvement is large.
The literature on RJV and collusion is relatively sparse, and leaves the
issue of the desirability of a wider RJV breadth unexplored.
In fact, Martin (1995) develops a model in which tacit collusion is impor-
tant. However, he assumes collusion in the pre-innovation stage, and shows
that RJVs strengthen the possibility of a tacit agreement. This happens be-
cause a defection breaks up the RJV, making the retaliation harsher. In a
context of horizontal product di⁄erentiation, Lambertini et al. (2002) prove
that RJVs ￿ resulting in the lack of di⁄erentiation ￿ destabilize collusion.
This happens because, with identical products, a small deviation grants, al-
beit temporarily, the whole market. When the decisions to join a cartel and
a RJV are simultaneous, Catilina and Feinberg (2006) show that a RJV may
provide the additional synergy that makes the cartel stable. Cooper and
Ross (2008) highlight that a RJV in one market may provide a credible pun-
ishment for ￿rms colluding in another market, thereby facilitating collusion
there. Miyagiwa (2008) suggests that RJVs favour collusion, because innova-
tion sharing eliminates inter-￿rm asymmetries, and increase industry pro￿ts,
which contributes to the stability of collusion.
2 The Model
2.1 A simple stochastic innovation set-up
We consider an industry composed of n symmetric ￿rms:When the possibility
to develop a new technology opens up, every ￿rm ￿nds pro￿table to form the
RJV. Accordingly, they establish a joint research lab, allowing them to obtain
3the technical improvement with a probability intensity h; which is assumed
to be linear in the overall cost that the ￿rms agree to sustain. We introduce
the linearity assumption because it favours the welfare dominance of type-
II RJVs. In fact, the stronger incentive to innovate provided by a type-II
RJVs yields an higher increase in the hazard rate under constant returns,
than under decreasing ones.2
When the RJV is of type-I, each ￿rm i must sink, at the discovery time,
a ￿xed cost F, then it obtains the non-collusive pro￿t, ￿i
n; that is higher
than the initial one, ￿i
0. Notice that the subscript indicates the number of
￿rms which have introduced the new technology. If RJVs are of type-II, each




which is the pro￿t obtained under implicit collusion.
Firms discount future pro￿ts at the common rate r.




































where zI;i is ￿rm i￿ s contribution to the joint lab, and ￿ is a research produc-
tivity parameter. It is trivial to obtain
hI = [n￿(￿n ￿ rF ￿ ￿0)]
1=2 ￿ r; (1)
which leads to introduce the following natural assumption, guaranteeing that
￿for a type-I RJV ￿it is pro￿table to invest in research:
A1: ￿i
n ￿ rF ￿ ￿i
0 > r2=(n￿):
The comparative statics for Equation (1) delivers sensible results: the
discovery hazard rate depends positively on the pro￿t incentive ￿i
n ￿ ￿i
0, on
2Notice that, with constant returns, formulating the problem as in Loury (1979), or as
in Lee and Wilde (1980) yields the same results.
4the number of ￿rms bene￿ting from the discovery, and on the productivity of
the research lab; it depends negatively on the size of the ￿xed cost, and on
the interest rate.















































Notice that hII > hI; due to the increase in the post-innovation pro￿ts,
and to the reduction in the ￿xed cost born by each ￿rm.
2.2 Pro￿ts and Welfare with process innovation
We consider an industry producing an homogeneous good. Market demand
is linear and equal to P = a ￿ Q, where P is the market clearing price and
Q =
Pn
i=1 qi is the total quantity supplied. Each ￿rm incurs the same unit
cost of production c.3 When the R&D investment is successful, the ensuing
process innovation shrinks the unit production cost by an amount x, with
x < c. Hence ￿rm i￿ s post￿ innovation production cost is C(qi) = (c ￿ x)qi.
Before introducing the process innovation, ￿rms compete ￿ la Cournot,




(n + 1)2; 8i;
3We use this framework, since it is standard in the RJV literature from the seminal
papers by d￿ Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) and by Kamien et al. (1992). Moreover, in
horizontal di⁄erentiation models following d￿ Aspremont et al. (1979), either there is full
marker coverage ￿and hence collusion for given locations does not alter social surplus ￿or
the ￿rms act as local monopolists.
5where A = a ￿ c is a market dimension measure: The instantaneous welfare
(computed ￿ la Marshall as the sum of consumers￿and producers￿surpluses)







Once ￿rms have obtained the cost-reducing innovation by means of a type-
I RJV, they produce more than in the status quo, selling at a lower market















with Wn > W0; since x > 0:
If ￿rms are allowed to enter in a type￿ II agreement, they may collude on
the product market once the process innovation has been obtained. Rather
than assuming that each ￿rm obtains 1=nth of the monopoly pro￿t, we con-









where ￿ 2 [0;1] is a parameter capturing the reduction in the horizontal ex-
ternality among ￿rms, which is associated to collusion.4 When ￿ = 0; ￿rms
compete ￿ la Cournot, and the horizontal externality is maximum; the case
￿ = 1 corresponds to monopoly, and the externality is fully internalized. We
interpret ￿ as re￿ ecting the e⁄ectiveness of the Antitrust Authority (hence-
forth Antitrust).5 When the latter is strong, to avoid triggering its reaction,
4Notice that ￿ can also be interpreted as the constant conjectural variation parameter.
(See Martin, 2001, Chapter 3).
5If the Antitrust could freely decide upon its e⁄ectiveness, it would induce a value for ￿
implying the welfare-maximizing RJV breadth.
6￿rms solve Problem (3) agreeing on a low ￿. When the Antitrust is powerless,
￿ is set close to unity.
Standard calculations show that:
￿i;C
n (￿) =
[￿(n ￿ 1) + 1](A + x)2
[n + 1 + ￿(n ￿ 1)]2 ; 8i;
while the instantaneous social welfare is:
Wn(￿) =
n[2￿(n ￿ 1) + n + 2]






































where hI(= n￿zI;i) and hII(= n￿zII;i) are given by (1) and (2), respectively.
2.3 The result
We now prove:
Proposition 1 When Assumption 1 is ful￿lled, there exist at most one ￿;
which is ^ ￿; such that, for ￿ 2 [0; ^ ￿]; SWII(￿) ￿ SWI:
Proof. Refer to the Appendix
When SWII(1) > SWI, the NCRPA is always preferable; if instead
SWII(1) ￿ SWI there is a unique ￿ guaranteeing that ￿for lower market
distortions ￿a type-II RJV improves welfare upon a type-I agreement.
However, the Antitrust e⁄ectiveness depends upon her budget constraint, and upon the
degree of RJV private information (Besanko and Spulber (1989)). These features limit the
Antitrust ability to manipulate ￿. Such extensions to our model, make the analysis more
complex. Accordingly they are left for future research.
7It is interesting to compute ^ ￿; to gauge which is the maximum degree of
￿nal market collusion allowing for a positive welfare e⁄ect of a wider RJV
breadth.
Because we compute calendar time in years, we set the interest rate to
0.03. We consider the size of innovation x as a proportion of the market
dimension parameter A; so that ￿without loss of generality ￿we can set the
latter equal to 1. The innovation sizes we consider are x 2 f0:1; 0:3; 0:5; 0:7g:
For each x; the R&D e¢ ciency parameter ￿ is calibrated with reference to a
￿baseline￿case, in which the type￿ I RJV success rate, hI, is equal to 0.20.
In each baseline case, n = 6; and the R&D cost zI;i(= hI=(n￿)) is equal
to the ￿xed cost F: The fact that hI it is not increasing in x; but rather is
constant, favours the welfare dominance of the type￿ II RJV for high x levels.
In fact, the higher is the success probability, the less welfare increasing is the
hastening of the innovation process induced by a type-II RJV. The choice
n = 6 favours the type￿ II RJV for high n: an increase in the number of ￿rms
reduces hI because ￿n shrinks,6 and the ￿hastening e⁄ect￿of type￿ II RJVs
becomes socially more valuable.
In Figure 1, ^ ￿ is portrayed as a function of zI;i=F, the continuos line
represents ^ ￿ for x = 0:1; the dashed line is drawn for x = 0:3; the dotted line
for 0.5, and the dashed-dotted for 0.7.
[Figure 1 about here]
The three Panels in Figure 1 depicts ^ ￿ for n = f2; 6; 12g7 if ￿ = 0:5:
Clearly, these scenarios favours the type￿ II RJV, since the savings in ￿xed
costs they entail are relevant. In particular, in case of a duopoly, any cost
duplication is avoided.
The fact that ^ ￿ is decreasing in zI;i=F is not surprising: when the weight
of F is low compared to the pure R&D cost, a type￿ II RJV becomes less
6This e⁄ect is weak for low n because @h
I=@n < 0; and @h
II=(@n)
2 < 0 (refer to Eq.
(1)).
7Seldeslachts et al. (2008) report that the 43% of US RJVs is composed of less than four
￿rms, the 36% is made up of four to nine enterprises (with an average of 5.75), while the
remaining 21% is composed of ten or more ￿rms.
8appealing since the savings in ￿xed costs it entails are relatively smaller. An
increase in x shifts upward the threshold ^ ￿; because a larger innovation size
makes the introduction of the innovation more valuable from the perspective
of the intertemporal welfare. Accordingly, a type￿ II RJV ￿ hastening the
innovative process ￿becomes more appealing.
The values for ^ ￿ reported in Figure 1 are low. Hence, our calculations
imply that a wider RJV breadth is welfare enhancing only if: i) the action of
the Antitrust is e⁄ective in limiting the degree of collusion, ii) the saving in
￿xed costs it allows is signi￿cant, and iii) the size of the technical improvement
is large.
Accordingly, a higher RJV breadth, as granted under the NCRPA, is
unlikely to improve social welfare.
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104 Appendix
Proof for Proposition 1.
We ￿rst show that SWII(0) > SWI; that assures us that the savings in
the ￿xed cost guaranteed by a type-II RJV improve welfare, had this joint
venture implied no increase in the market distortion.















r + hII :
Taking advantage of Eq. (2), to substitute (r+hII) out of the addendum


















r + hII :
From Eq. (2) we immediately see that @hII=@v < 0; Notice that the
numerator of the expression in the big square brackets, when evaluated at
￿ = 0; is positive. (This can be easily obtained exploiting the expressions
in Sub-section (2.2)). The denominator in the big square brackets in the









and hence that SWII(0) > SWI; for v 2 [0;1):
We now show that the decrease in SWII(￿); caused by an increase in ￿;
implies the existence of at most ￿ 2 [0;1]; such that SWII(^ ￿) = SWI; so
that, for ￿ 2 [0; ^ ￿]; SWII(￿) ￿ SWI:
Since
SWII(￿) =











Wn(￿) ￿ rn￿F ￿ W0






























n￿(n ￿ 1)2(1 ￿ ￿)(A + x)2
2(r + hII)[n + 1 + ￿(n ￿ 1)]3: (A2)
Notice that @hII=@￿ > 0, for ￿ 2 [0;1): an increase in pro￿ts hastens
innovation.




n(n ￿ 1)[1 + ￿(n ￿ 1)]
[n + 1 + ￿(n ￿ 1)]3 (A + x)2: (A3)
Obviously, @Wn(￿)=@￿ < 0: an increase in ￿; and therefore in the market
distortion, reduces the instantaneous welfare.




n(n ￿ 1)(A + x)2
2(r + hII)[n + 1 + ￿(n ￿ 1)]3
("






￿(n ￿ 1)(1 ￿ ￿) ￿
2hII
r
[1 + ￿(n ￿ 1)]
)
:
Exploiting Eq. (2), substitute (r + hII) out of the addendum in the big




n(n ￿ 1)(A + x)2








n ￿ r￿F ￿ ￿i
0)
#
(n ￿ 1)(1 ￿ ￿) ￿
2hII
r
[1 + ￿(n ￿ 1)]
)
:
When Wn(￿) ￿ n￿
i;C
n ￿ (W0 ￿ n￿i
0) ￿ 0; the derivative (A4) is negative;
hence, there is at most one ￿ 2 [0;1] such that for ￿ 2 [0; ^ ￿]; SWII(￿) ￿ SWI:
When instead Wn(￿) ￿ n￿
i;C
n ￿ (W0 ￿ n￿i
0) > 0; which happens if ￿ <
(n+1)x
(n￿1)A; it is convenient to de￿ne:
G(￿) =
n(n ￿ 1)(A + x)2










n ￿ r￿F ￿ ￿i
0)
#
(n ￿ 1)(1 ￿ ￿) ￿
2hII
r
[1 + ￿(n ￿ 1)]
)
:
It is immediate to notice that G(￿) > 0: As for F(￿); notice that: F(0) 7
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0)2
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n ￿ r￿F ￿ ￿i
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#
(n ￿ 1) ￿
2hII
r








Because @Wn(￿)=@￿ < 0; (Eq. (A2)), and @￿
i;C
n =@￿ > 0; the ￿rst adden-




0) > 0; the fact that @￿C
n=@￿ > 0 guarantees that also the second adden-
dum is negative. It is obvious that also the third and the fourth addenda of





0) > 0 we have that @F(￿)=@￿ <
0; which guarantees that either @SWII(￿)=@￿ < 0 for ￿ 2 [0;1] (when F(0) <
0); or @SWII(￿)=@￿ = 0 for a unique ￿ 2 [0;1] (when F(0) > 0):




Panel (a): n = 2   
 
Panel (b): n = 6 
 
 
Panel (c): n = 12 